What else life if not awkward? by Corcoran, Tim
1 
 
What else life if not awkward? 
  
For the word (and, consequently, for a human being) there is nothing 
more terrible that a lack of response (Bakhtin, 1986, p.127) 
 
Only after having been invited by the editors of this journal to respond to Jonathan Potter’s 
(this edition) attentive piece, did I come across the following: 
 
…there is a third term to the relation between man and nature, culture, 
which is not genetically inherited but communicated to man after birth 
as a “second nature”.  It is this third term that psychology, in its 
attempts to be “scientific”, has ignored (Shotter, 1975, p.136) 
 
This statement comes at the end of a very short and yet still remarkably relevant text, Images 
of man in psychological research.  Apart from the obvious coincidence – ‘Second nature’ 
(hereafter 2N) being the title of the paper prompting Potter’s article - I draw attention to this 
quote because it lives within a tradition in which I situate the kind of work I am interested in 
pursuing as a psychologist.  In important ways it is a different kind of work from the work 
Potter describes and herein I shall continue to highlight the tensions evident between forms of 
discursive psychology maintained by epistemological constructionism (DPEC) and forms 
premised on a discursive psychology reliant on ontological constructionism (DPOC).  Both 
approaches, I believe, intend to address second nature accounts of human being and yet it is in 
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how they signify and carry out their intent that their purposes may be known.  Having 
highlighted some points where DPEC and DPOC crossover I will go on to discuss three areas 




To begin this response, in the spirit of Bakhtin (see above), I would like to thank Potter for his 
attention to the 2N paper and participation in the ongoing dialogue concerning discursive 
psychology (DP).  Predictably, Potter’s riposte works incredibly hard to show my 
(mis)understanding of DP.  I shall outline below how much of what Potter suggests about 2N 
is what one would expect from typical academic debate.  In sum, differences (presumed or 
actual) are far easier to promulgate than similarities.  Whilst I accept the importance of 
engaging distinctions I nevertheless want to immediately highlight some of the similarities I 
see apparent between DPOC and DPEC.  So, to our first point of potential agreement.  It is a 
fair suggestion, made by Potter, that binary divisions may create an impression of simple 
mutual exclusivity.  This was never the intention of the 2N paper.  In fact, therein I called for 
collaborative efforts by discursive psychologists in resisting the impact of first nature 
psychologies.  Thus, the initial point requiring emphasis is that DPOC and DPEC assumptions 
should be encountered, not as distinct and independent poles but instead engaged as related 
positions linked by their interests in discursive psychological applications.  Future 
developments in the theory of DP will add to working through the nuances of this field, a DP 





Further similarities can be recognised in an acknowledgement of complexity and variability in 
social action.  As those conversant with DP will know, studying descriptions created via talk 
and text is central to this work.  I agree with Potter that analytic focus should attend to areas 
of joint action (Shotter, 1995) ‘where intersubjectivity is a contested space, as both parties 
draw on the normative resources of talk’ (Potter, 2010, p.31).  But here I am also indebted to 
Wetherell (2007) and a concurring account of DPOC (although in Wetherell’s paper the terms 
‘discursive psychology’ and ‘ontological constructionism’ are not entwined). The normative 
resources Potter refers to and Wetherell discusses are the words and meanings people use to 
describe themselves and others in daily activities.  In 2N I looked no further than our own 
backyard: 
 
As psychologists we, along with other professions that form and 
inform available discourses pertaining to human being, share a 
responsibility to acknowledge our belonging to and existence in 
language.  It will be from this acknowledgement that psychology can 
chart the means to create, in a proactive sense, a language of 
potentials, enablement and respect that serve as alternatives to the 
more historically dominant languages of constraint, disablement and 
disrespect (Corcoran, 2009, p.379). 
 
As participants in joint action, our professional use of normative resources (often those 
sourced from first nature psychologies) continuously calls on us to make ethical choices.  We 
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should, I believe, remain vigilantly aware of our relationships to\within discursive traditions 
and it is to this concern my attention now turns. 
 
Relating to traditions 
 
I think it is important to restate my position, which resonates with Hepburn’s (2006), that an 
important aim for critical psychology is to ‘disrupt rather than destroy’ contemporary 
disciplinary accounts, including those emanating from DP.  Acknowledgement of this point 
leads to an acceptance that we cannot erase tradition from our forms of language use.  ‘The 
text lives’, Bakhtin (1986, p.162) states, ‘only by coming into contact with another text (with 
context).  Only at the point of this contact between texts does a light flash, illuminating both 
the posterior and anterior, joining a given text to a dialogue’.  And so, it is from within the 
ongoing dialogue that is disciplinary psychology (including its responsive relationship to 
philosophy) that I am unsure how Potter can claim that DP is ‘defined by its analytic studies 
and their success rather than a priori stipulations.  It is not a project grounded in philosophy’ 
(p.4).  Immediately, this reminds me of the difficulties I have had with engaging certain 
methods for I am doubtful whether researchers, when asked to do so in the pursuit of their 
investigations, can actually suspend the posterior and anterior of their situatedness in the 
world.  If, what Potter is requesting, is that psychologists should be wary of the constitutive 
nature of discourse, as in Vygotsky’s (1978) method as tool-and-result approach, then yes, we 
would be in agreement.  But I do not understand how anyone (or any text) can be removed or 




This line of discussion draws me to what I see as being one of the central places where Potter 
and I disagree.  It would seem that Potter is looking to rally the masses to fight against the 
power that is first nature psychologies and the discourses supporting such work. It should not 
come as surprising that we stand shoulder to shoulder on this front.  However, I foresee 
possibilities in working with as well as against dominant viewpoints so as to actively remain 
in the dialogue.  This seems to have been misinterpreted by Potter as he positions me as 
advocating for forms of objectivism (p.3 or p.12) or mentalism (p.15-16).  This is a strange 
occurrence given the efforts made in 2N to distinguish between first and second nature 
accounts of personhood.  Most directly, this confusion will be cleared up below as I discuss 
how I understand the theorist’s relationships with the people whose lives we describe in the 
work we produce.  Briefly put, my position does advocate for academics respecting a person’s 
availability to choose the kinds of discourse with which they engage in their worlds.  But a 
crucial distinction needs to be made here.  Respect for such volition and an ability to engage 
with their position, with a purpose other than merely reporting its occurrence, is pragmatically 
different from endorsing particular discourse – another inference mistakenly made of 2N by 
Potter.  Potentially, the reason for such misapprehension stems from the fact that there remain 
aspects of psychological understanding, to do with human nature, that have not been 
accounted for in disciplinary discourse or by DPEC.      
             
Relating to data 
 
‘[D]iscursive psychology’ Potter proclaims ‘is a technical and analytic enterprise’ (p.15).  
This proclamation should come as no surprise given the way in which Potter continually 
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grasps for, and almost mantra-like, invokes the concept of ‘naturalistic materials’.  The point 
of harvesting data like this is to provide accounts of how our social worlds are relationally 
responsive via their conversational, as opposed to statistical or causal natures.  I have no issue 
with the discursive psychologist as farmer metaphor – no doubt, it has greater appeal than 
being a dead scientist.  But I am afraid, that contrary to Potter’s claim, there is no ‘magic’ 
(p.20) to naturalistic data.  The suggestion regarding ‘naturalistic’ data is that it ‘breaks out of 
the analyst’s agenda’ (p.20) because the material already occurs in ‘the extraordinary richness 
of the outside world’ (p.20).  I wholeheartedly applaud Potter’s attempts to address the 
influence of the researcher upon the ‘outside world’ but there is one necessary admission I 
think we both would agree on: magic is a con.  Instead of holding up ‘naturalistic’ data as 
agenda-mitigated (like the levitated magician’s assistant), psychologists should be constantly 
looking to explicate how their involvement is embedded in the research they present.  But the 
issue is more than one of mere admission. 
 
In a continuance of the farming metaphor Potter suggests that the 2N paper provides ‘the 
barest of sketches and has not matured to provide analytic fruit that can be evaluated’ (2010, 
p.4).  For whatever reason, Potter did not seek out the references to my own work provided in 
the 2N paper (Corcoran, 2003; 2005).  If what Potter was doing was limiting his critique to 
the 2N paper then I would want to know whether analytic bounty can/should only be gauged 
by empirical study?  This question is going to return us to the suggestion that DP work is not 




The purpose of inquiry is to achieve agreement among human beings 
about what to do, to bring about consensus on the ends to be achieved 
and the means to be used to achieve those ends.  Inquiry that does not 
achieve coordination of behaviour is not inquiry but simply 
wordplay…There is no deep split between theory and practice, 
because on a pragmatist view so-called “theory” which is not 
wordplay is always already practice (1999, p.xxv)   
 
Can we agree that the 2N paper alone is a means, much like any other theoretical work, to 
informing practice?  Nevertheless, if theory and practice are to be disassociated – a position I 
do not endorse – then how was it that the practical (qua empirical) opportunities proffered in 
2N were not engaged? 
              
With its focus on what is ‘empirically progressive’ Potter’s version of DPEC research would 
seem to set its agenda on a kind of review-mirroring of social action.  At this point I am 
reminded of something Ken Gergen said almost 20 years ago.  When discussing the ongoing 
work of psychologists he proposed: ‘Rather than “telling it like it is” the challenge for the 
postmodern psychologist is to “tell it as it may become”’ (1992, p.27).  This simple but 
fundamental point is ignored by the DPEC research agenda.  Speaking here, in part as a 
member of the discipline but just as importantly as an active participant in the glocal 
community (Brooks & Normore, 2010), I experience the potential loss of such opportunity as 
egregious for its compliance to an enduring end-game.  If the epistemic position is about 
merely reporting what is taking place in the ‘outside world’ how will we ever enable research 
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to harness the power of discourse in service of preferred futures?  The issue of exactly whose 
futures I will come to momentarily.  Instead, with DPEC’s dedication to naturalistic materials, 
‘telling it like it is’ overrides such concern and ultimately fails to acknowledge that the 
positions being created, for researchers and those researched, are indubitably ontological 
ones.    
 
Relating to people 
 
I would not claim, as Potter seems to suggest, that our relationships with those we research 
should be about the epistemological purity of the process – life is too awkward to search for 
such methodological relics.  In 2N I gave a practice-based example from my years working as 
a prison psychologist and then a school-based one.   The example bears repeating again for it 
speaks to how forms of psychological practice actually inform methodological and therapeutic 
engagement.  Briefly, I stated that psychologists should be wary of getting ahead of the people 
they engage.  By this I meant that the moment practitioners presume to know where a 
narrative is going or what the meaning of a turn of phrase is, they no longer are engaged with 
the person but acting upon them in a form of closed judgement.  This is not to say that 
psychologists do not make judgements – of course we do and this is a fundamental point I 
have attempted to convey.  These ontological commitments are inherent in the ways in which 
we practice just as they are evident in the discourses people use to go about the living of their 
lives.  To claim, as Potter has, that engagement with talk (e.g. when a psychologist attempts to 
understand an individual’s articulation of racial or xenophobic discourse) is tantamount to 
endorsement, is plainly incorrect.  Judgements occur, no doubting that, but these movements 
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should present within an ethic of respect for the person we are in conversation with.  This is 
the point I am unsure Potter prioritises as perhaps tellingly he admits: DP ‘…is not designed 
in the first instance to build connections with research participants…[i]t is designed to address 
the community of analysts, psychologists, social scientists and so on’ (p.14-15).  What might 





A fundamental commitment I make as a psychologist is an assumption regarding the capacity 
for change in human being.  Let me caveat that by acknowledging that there are some 
individuals for whom change is indeed less likely.  Such admittance speaks to the very 
diversity and complexity of human nature.  In the few years I worked in prison there were 
times when I was challenged to maintain a prospective view of people’s potentials.  Thus, 
here I should reiterate, mine is not a naive position opposed to all forms of institutional 
sanction (e.g. incarceration; Corcoran, 2005).  Nonetheless, the point with which I conclude 
centres on psychologists and psychology’s commitment to change.  This is an ontological 
commitment for it engages social research and professional practices in what should be 
understood to be a more prospective kind of relationship.  Rather than prioritising forms of 
technical analysis, as in the DPEC position or say psychometrics, the thrust of the 2N paper 
was to call for psychological practices oriented towards understanding ontological 
possibilities from within ethically responsive relationships.  These relationships - to tradition, 
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to data and to people – cannot be denied.  Hence, for psychologists, a nagging question recurs: 
How, via our practices, are we to respond? 
 
One possibility is for psychologists to scrutinise how they themselves continue to translate 
principles of disciplinary practice.  Here, committed engagement repeatedly relies on 
processes of discursive translation which, fundamental to its purpose, have the potential to 
create different ways of negotiating meaning.  According to Bhabha, we can never arrive at an 
original or ‘totalised prior moment of being’, for any culture, discipline or person exists only 
in relation to another.  This exchange between cultures, disciplines or peoples invites 
thirdness – a heterotopic space wherein new meanings may be enabled to emerge via 
processes of hybridisation.  Bhabha (Rutherford, 1990, p. 211) explains: 
 
…the importance of hybridity is that it bears the traces of those 
feelings and practices which inform it, just like a translation, so that 
hybridity puts together the traces of certain other meanings or 
discourses.  It does not give them authority of being prior in the sense 
of being original: they are prior only in the sense of being anterior.  
The process of cultural hybridity gives rise to something different, 
something new and unrecognisable, a new area of negotiation of 
meaning and representation.    
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In seeking the prospective potentials of second nature understandings, those hybridised and 
heterotopic ways of accounting and enabling of our forms of life, psychology continues to 
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